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Self, body, and consciousness: affinities between enactivism, phenomenology and Luhmann’s systems theory
Abstract
This article introduces Niklas Luhmann's theory into current research on self-identity, exploring its affinities with enactivist and phenomenological theories. While both approaches recognize the importance of the social dimension, they have overlooked Luhmann's sociology despite their compatibilities. On the other hand, a dialogue with these approaches can enrich Luhmann’s theory to clarify some of its problematic elements. The main objective is to address the problem of psychic systems and their coupling with the body. The article proposes four theses: 1) autopoiesis theory provides a generalizable conception of identity across various systems; 2) the phenomenological notion of the minimal self is equivalent to the autopoietic identity of the psychic system; 3) the self of consciousness implies coupling with the biological organism; 4) the medium of meaning enables the interpenetration between consciousness and the organism. This last thesis challenges a fundamental assumption of Luhmann's theory, but the article argues the necessity of revisiting it to facilitate dialogue and mutual enrichment among different approaches.Keywords:
Self-identity, Consciousness, Enactivism, Phenomenology, Social systems theoryReferences
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