The Reconfiguration of the Global Financial Regime: Between the Public Determination and the Private Self-determination
Abstract
The financial crisis of 2008 amended the sustained relationships between the political system, the legal system and the financial system globally. Given the inability of the regulatory structures of the concerned countries to safeguard the stability of its markets, the political solution has focused in increased state involvement on legal bodies to supervise financial processes, causing a new turn in the dispute over sustained control of financial regulation between the political system and the financial system. This article explores the origins and the potential effects of this emerging dynamics, identifying the main structural links arranged by the State to correct the functional defects of the global financial system, as well as the roots of dedifferentiation derived regulatory capture in which incurred historically the financial system. To describe this emerging dynamics from a sociological perspective, was conjugated the optic that provides analytical systems theory with own theoretical arsenal of financial regulation, including recent empirical research in this field. Finally, this article highlight the functional advantages of this intersystemic struggle, introducing a reflection that rescues its benefits to the social system in the long term.Keywords:
Regulatory regimes, Legal sociology, Financial system, Dedifferentiation, Systems theoryReferences
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Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2013). Leveraged Interests. Financial Industry Power and the Role of Private Sector Coalitions. Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), 575-610.
Painter, R. (2009). Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When Government Pays the Tab. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper, N° 09/37.
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Polanyi, K. (2001). La gran transformación. México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Schultz, L., & Thompson, R. (2010). The Future of Agency Independence. Vanderbilt Law Review, 63(599), 623-646.
Seeling, S., & Novoa, A. (2009). Governance Practices at Financial Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies. IMF Working Paper.
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Teubner, G. (2011). A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of ‘Hitting the Bottom'. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 3-42). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
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Stäheli, U. (2011). Political Epidemiology and the Financial Crisis. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 113-130). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
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Armijo, L. (2001). The Political Geography of World Financial Reform: Who Wants What and Why? Global Governance, 7(4), 379-396.
Best, J. (2010). The Limits of Financial Risk Management: Or what we didn't learn from the Asian Crisis. New Political Economy, 15(1), 29-49.
Borak, D. (2013). Financial Stability Board Warn Countries Against Protectionism. American Banker, 178(61), 25.
Brasset, J., & Clarke, C. (2012). Performing the Sub-Prime Crisis: Trauma and the Financial Event. International Political Sociology, 6(1), 4-20.
Carey, S., & Lebo, M. (2006). Election Cycles and the Economic Voter. Political Research Quarterly, 59(4), 543-556.
Cross, G. (2012). Addressing the Problem of Cyclical Capture. En S. Pagliari (Ed.), The Making Good Financial Regulation (pp. 173-180). Londres: International Centre for Financial Regulation.
Douglas, A., & Taylor, M. (2009). The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation? AIIFL Working Paper, 32(6), 488-513.
Dowd, K. (2009). Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis. Cato Journal, 29(1), 141-166.
Febbrajo, A. (2011). The Failure of Regulatory Institutions? En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 269-302). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
FSB (2013). Progress and Next Steps towards Ending "Too-Big-To-Fail" (TBTF). Report of the financial Stability Board to the G20.
Gadinis, S. (2013a). From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation. Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 327(101), 327-389.
Gadinis, S. (2013b). The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial Regulation. Texas International Law Journal, 48(2), 157-176.
Green, D. (2012). Political Capture and the Regulatory Cycle. En S. Pagliari (Ed.), The Making Good Financial Regulation (pp. 136-148). Londres: International Centre for Financial Regulation.
Helleiner, E., & Pagliari, S. (2011). The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda. International Organization, 65(1), 169-200.
Keynes, J. (2009). Teoría general de la ocupación, el interés, y el dinero. México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Kjaer, P. (2011). Law and Order within and Beyond National Configurations. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 395-430). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Ladeur, K. (2011). The Financial Market Crisis-A Network Failure?. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 63-92). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Lo Schiavo, G. (2013). The European Supervisory Authorities: A True Evolutionary Step along the Proccess of European Financial Integration? En N. Bukantenié (Eds.), The Interaction of National Legal Systems: Convergence or Divergence? (pp. 293-301). Vilnius: Vilnius University.
Luhmann, N. (2005). El derecho de la sociedad. México D.F.: Editorial Herder.
Luhmann, N. (2006). La sociedad de la sociedad. México D.F.: Editorial Herder.
Mascareño, A. (2007). Regímenes jurídicos en la constitución de la sociedad mundial. Política Criminal, 4, 1-39.
Mascareño, A. (2010). Diferenciación y contingencia en América Latina. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Universidad Alberto Hurtado.
Mascareño, A. (2011). Crisis Ethics. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 333-354). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Mascareño, A. (2013). Justicia global y justicia sectorial en la sociedad mundial. Momentos de universalidad en la lex mercatoria. Dilemata, 5(13), 45-68.
Mereminskaya, E., & Mascareño, A. (2005). La desnacionalización del derecho y la formación de regímenes globales de gobierno. En M. Martinic (Ed.), Sesquicentenario del Código Civil de Andrés Bello: Pasado, presente y futuro de la codificación (pp. 1391-1427). Santiago: Lexis-Nexis.
Mereminskaya, E., & Mascareño, A. (2011). Colisión y armonización de regímenes regulatorios en contextos sociales globales. Fondecyt N°1110437.
Pagliari, S. (2012a). Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the Regulation of Derivatives, Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds. European Law Journal, 18(1), 44-61.
Pagliari, S. (2012b). A Wall around Europe? The European Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis and the Turn in Transatlantic Relations. Journal of European Integration, 35(4), 391-408.
Pagliari, S. (2012c). How Can We Mitigate Capture in Financial Regulation? En S. Pagliari (Ed.), The Making Good Financial Regulation (pp. 1-59). Londres: International Centre for Financial Regulation.
Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2013). Leveraged Interests. Financial Industry Power and the Role of Private Sector Coalitions. Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), 575-610.
Painter, R. (2009). Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When Government Pays the Tab. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper, N° 09/37.
Pan, E. (2011). Understanding Financial Regulation. Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 329, 1897-1947.
Polanyi, K. (2001). La gran transformación. México D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Schultz, L., & Thompson, R. (2010). The Future of Agency Independence. Vanderbilt Law Review, 63(599), 623-646.
Seeling, S., & Novoa, A. (2009). Governance Practices at Financial Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies. IMF Working Paper.
Stigler, G. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3-21.
Teubner, G. (2005). El derecho como sistema autopoiético de la sociedad global. Bogotá: Universidad externado de Colombia.
Teubner, G. (2011). A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of ‘Hitting the Bottom'. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 3-42). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Teubner, G. (2012). Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stäheli, U. (2011). Political Epidemiology and the Financial Crisis. En P. Kjaer, G. Teubner, & A. Febbrajo (Eds.), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark side of Functional Differentiation (pp. 113-130). Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Willke, H. (2007). Smart Governance: Governing the Global Knowledge Society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Fuentes de Internet
BIS (2013). Financial Stability Forum decides to broaden its membership. Consultado el 4 de junio de 2013. http://www.bis.org/press/p090312c.htm.
Elmundo.es (2006). "La BBK perdona al PSOE 21 millones de euros tras cancelar una deuda impagada desde los 80". Consultado el 10 de septiembre de 2013. http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/06/09/espana/1149820855.html
Hernanz, C. (2011). "Santander 'refinanció' la deuda del PSOE y dio una hipoteca a Zapatero durante su mandato". Consultado el 10 de septiembre de 2013. http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2011/11/28/santander-refinancio-la-deuda-del-psoe-y-dio-una-hipoteca-a-zapatero-durante-su-mandato-88466/
